UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-23-2015

State v. Beeks Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42022

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Beeks Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42022" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5348.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5348

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

v.

)

TRISTUM BEEKS,

)
)
)

________
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 42022
CANYON COUNTY
NO. CR 2013-22258

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT dAPPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

PAGE
............................... ii

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1
ISSU

PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 5

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................6

I.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury As To The
Intent Element Of The Offense And In Refusing To Instruct The
Jury That Acts Or Omissions Committed Through Misfortune Or
Accident Are Not Criminal .....................................................................................6
A. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Failing To
Instruct The Jury As To The Necessary Intent Element Of The
Offense ............................................................................................................6
B. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Instruct The Jury That Acts
Or Omissions Committed Through Misfortune Or Accident Are
Not Criminal ................................................................................................... 11

II. The State Engaged In Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial ............................ 13
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct. .............................................................................. 13
B. It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Tell The Jury That There
Would Be Information In The Case He Was Not Allowed To Talk
About And That Mr. Beeks Had A Prior Domestic Violence Charge .............. 16
C. It Was Misconduct To Repeatedly Reference Multiple No
Contact Orders .............................................................................................. 20
CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................24
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 25

v. United

1

U

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U
In re Winship, 397 U

432 (1

................................................. ?

637 (1974) ................................................. 19

363 (1970) ........................................................... ..

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .............................................................. 7
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ............................................................ 7
State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995) ................................................ 15
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743 (2007) ............................................................. 7
State v. Baldwin, 69 Idaho 459 (1949) ............................................................... .
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) .......................................... 1
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463 (2007) ...................................................... 14
State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43 (Ct. App. 2000) ...................................................... 7
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576 (2011 ) ..................................................................7
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993) ....................................................................... 7
State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15 (Ct. App. 2008) ..................................................... 15
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35 (1903) ......................................................................... 14
State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873 ( 1987) ................................................................. 11
State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................. 9, 10
State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001) ............................................... 15
State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925 (2008) .................................................................. 7
State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666 (Ct. App. 2012) .................................................. 7
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) .................................................. 6, 13, 15, 23

ii

1

V.
V.

State v.

101

(2009). .... .......... ............. ,. ................ 1
( 1980) . .. . .... . ... . ....... ... . .. .. . . .. . .................... 1

139 Idaho 402 (Ct. App. 2003) ... .......... ................. ...... ......... .

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) ..........................................................7
Taylorv. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) .......................................................... 14
Watson v. Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643 (1992) ............................. 11

Statutes
I.C. § 18-114 ............................................................................................... 7, 8, 9
I.C. § 18-201(3) ................................................................................................... 11

1.C. § 18-920 ..................................................................................................7, 8

Constitutional Provisions
IDAHOCONST., art. I§ 13 ........................................................................ 13, 19, 22
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV .................................................................. 13, 19, 22

Additional Authorities
Jury Instruction No.12 ...........................................................................................9
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 305 ...................................................................8, 9
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1508 .............................................................. .4, 11

Rules
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 ..........................................................................................4

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged Mr. Beeks with felony violation of a no contact order based
upon the allegation that Mr. Beeks had twice been convicted of prior violations of no
contact orders in the past five years. Mr. Beeks was convicted of felony violation of a
no contact order following a jury trial.
Mr. Beeks timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.

On

appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury. Specifically, he
contends that the district court should have instructed the jury as to the union of act and
intent requirement, and that acts or omissions committed through misfortune or
accident, and with no evil design, intention or culpable negligence, are not criminal.
Mr. Beeks also contends that the State engaged in several instances of misconduct
during his trial, which occurred during voir dire and closing statements. The prosecutor
told the jury several times that there was additional information that he was not allowed
to tell them, and later told the jury he was not allowed to introduce evidence of
Mr. Beeks' prior domestic assault or domestic battery charge.

Although the

prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to, Mr. Beeks asserts that it amounted to
fundamental error and therefore can be considered on appeal. The misconduct violated
Mr. Beeks' right to a fair trial and due process.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 8, 2013, Tristum Beeks had a jail visit via the jail's video visitation
system with Amanda Murillo, his domestic partner. 1 (Trial Tr., p.17, Ls.11-17, p.19,

1

The jail had a video visitation system, similar to Skyping on a computer. (Trial
Tr., p.12, Ls.13-23.) The inmate has a screen and the visitor, who is either down in the

1

Ls.5-23.) The video showed Ms. Murillo in the lobby of the Canyon County JaiL (Trial
Tr., p.19, Ls.12-18; State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Prior to the start of the video chat, a man
identified only as "Justin Timberlake" initially appeared on the screen, and seemed to be
taking direction from Mr. Beeks, who appeared in the background. (State's Trial Exhibit
1.) Mr. Timberlake asked Ms. Murillo if it was "okay to talk." (State's Trial Exhibit 1.)
Ms. Murillo responded, "Why not? Why wouldn't it be? Tell him to get his a** over
here." (State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Mr. Beeks again sought clarification and could be heard
in the background saying, "Tell her to answer the question." (State's Trial Exhibit 1.)
After Ms. Murillo again told Mr. Timberlake to tell Mr. Beeks to "get his a** over here,"
Mr. Beeks walked over to the camera/television and began talking to Ms. Murillo.
(State's Trial Exhibit 1.) They talked about their kids, football, and how things were
going at home.

(State's Trial Exhibit 1.)

Approximately fifteen minutes into their

conversation, there was discussion of a no contact order.

(State's Trial Exhibit 1.)

Specifically Mr. Beeks asked if Ms. Murillo had gotten it dropped-Ms. Murillo
responded that she had not. (State's Trial Exhibit 1.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Beeks was charged by Information with felony violation
of a no-contact order because Mr. Beeks had two prior convictions of violating a nocontact order. (R., pp.18-19.)
Mr. Beeks exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial.
Mr. Beeks' theories of the case at trial were (1) that he was never served with a
copy of the no contact order, (2) that all contact with Ms. Murillo, was purely accidental
and/or unintentional. The State maintained its theory that once Mr. Beeks knew that

visitation lobby or at their own home computer, has a screen attached to the
telephones. (Trial Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.13.)
2

Ms. Murillo had not had the no contact order lifted, he should have ended the video visit.
(Supplemental Trial Transcript (hereinafter, Supp. Trial Tr.), 2 p.76, Ls.1-4, p.78, Ls.1-3.)
Because he did not leave, but instead stayed and continued to speak with Ms. Murillo,
he was culpable. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.1-4.)
The State presented three witnesses at trial - Canyon County Sheriff's Deputy
Gail Howell, Canyon County Sheriff's Deputy Edward Hofkins, and Kenneth Boal, an
investigator with the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office.
Deputy Howell testified regarding the Telemate phone system and video
visitation system and how the video visits can be arranged. (Trial Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.17,
L.10.) Deputy Howell also testified that there was a video visit under Tristum Beeks'
account on September 8, 2013. (Trial Tr., p.19, Ls.5-8.)
Deputy Hofkins testified that he served a no contact order on Mr. Beeks that
expired on February 11, 2013.

(Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.2-15; State's Trial Exhibit 2.) He

testified that he put his name, badge number, and the date he gave it to Mr. Beeks on
his copy of the no contact order, which was not the same document as State's Trial
Exhibit 2. (Trial Tr., p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.15.) Although Kenneth Boals testified that there
were two no contact orders in effect at the time of the video visit (Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.1221 ), there was no testimony or evidence admitted at trial that Mr. Beeks had been
served with a no contact order that was effective on the date the video visit occurred.

2

The original Trial Transcript did not include the opening statements of counsel, the
closing statements of counsel, the jury instructions conference, the district court's
reading of the jury instructions, or the voir dire of the jury. After Mr. Beeks' Objection to
the Record was granted, a transcript was prepared that included these portions of the
trial. Such portions shall be identified as the Supplemental Trial Transcript for ease of
reference.
3

At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel moved the district court
for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29. (Trial Tr., p.43, L.8 p.45, L.12.)

The district court denied the motion and the defense rested without

presenting any testimony or evidence. (Trial Tr., p.50, L.10 - p.51, L. 7.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court heard from the parties concerning
jury instructions. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.74, L.3 - p.82, L.23.) The defense requested an
instruction based on Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1508 (stating, essentially, that acts
or omissions committed through misfortune or accident, and with no evil design,
intention or culpable negligence, are not criminal).

(Supp. Trial Tr., p.83, Ls.2-6;

R., pp.26A-26B.) However, the district court, after hearing argument from both parties,
declined to give the requested instruction. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.82, Ls.3-5.) The district
court ruled that the defense could still argue that the violation was unintentional, even
without the instruction. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.80, L.24 - p.82, L.3.) However, no instruction
on the union of act and intent was given by the district court.
The district court then went ahead and instructed the jury in accordance with its
rulings. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.83, L.12 - p.90, L.11.)
On January 7, 2014, the jury convicted Mr. Beeks of violating of a no-contact
order, and Mr. Beeks was then convicted by the jury of the enhancement to a felony.
(Trial Tr., p.55, Ls.12-18, p.61, L.23 - p.62, L.5; R., pp.36-38.)

The district court

sentenced Mr. Beeks to three years, with one and one-half years fixed, but retained
jurisdiction over Mr. Beeks. (3/14/14 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-5; R., pp.64-66.)
On April 4, 2014, Mr. Beeks timely appealed from his judgment of conviction and
sentence. (R., pp.67-71.)

4

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err in failing to instruct the jury on the necessary intent
element of the crime and in refusing to instruct the jury that acts or omissions
committed through misfortune or accident, and with no evil design, intention or
culpable negligence, are not criminal?

2.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of fundamental
error when it elicited testimony regarding the existence of two no contact orders,
and when it repeatedly told the jury that there was additional information that the
prosecutor was not allowed to tell the jury, including that Mr. Beeks had
previously been charged with either domestic assault or domestic battery?

5

I.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury As To The Intent Element Of The
Offense And In Refusing To Instruct The Jury That Acts Or Omissions Committed
Through Misfortune Or Accident Are Not Criminal
The jury in this case was never instructed that in order
must find a union of act and intent.

Mr. Beeks guilty, it

Further, the district court refused to give an

instruction as to misfortune or accident although such was requested by the defense.

A.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Failing To Instruct The Jury
As To The Necessary Intent Element Of The Offense
In Idaho, all

never instructed as

require a union

and

In this case the jury was

was error.

this requirement.

Mr. Beeks acknowledges that no objection was made to the
instruction on the union of act and intent.

jury

Therefore, the claim raised is one of

fundamental error. The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate
review of unobjected-to error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Under the
three-part test for fundamental error as set forth in Perry, a defendant must demonstrate
that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) there was a
clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not contained in the
appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning
that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.

Id. at 226.

If the defendant persuades the appellate court that the

complained-of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court must
vacate and remand the case. Id.

6

The first prong of Perry is satisfied because the requirement that the State prove
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional
guarantee of due process.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); State v.

Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct App. 2000).
This standard of proof "plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure"
because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law."'

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)

(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element
of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, State v.

Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007); see
also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); or as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee.

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999);

Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78. See also State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App.
2012).
The language of I.C. § 18-920 does not expressly require the state to prove a
particular type of intent to establish a violation of the statute. In such a circumstance,
where a criminal statute does not express a particular mental state, or specific intent, as
an element of the crime, then the offense only requires general intent on the part of the
perpetrator. See State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993). Idaho Code Section 18-114
requires that for every crime, "there must exist a union or joint operation, of act and
intent, or criminal negligence." The intent required by I.C. § 18-920 is not the intent to
commit a crime but is merely the intent to perform the interdicted act or by criminal
7

negligence the failure to perform the required act. Id. Therefore, a violation of I.C. § 18920 requires general intent, namely, that a person with a domestic assault or domestic
battery charge or conviction, after having been notified of the existence of a no contact
order, intentionally had contact with the person he was prohibited from contacting, not
that he or she intended to commit a crime.
Unlike other statutes that have been found to not have any knowledge or scienter
requirement, I.C. § 18-920 is not a public welfare offense, 3 but was intended specifically
to deter intentional and personally culpable conduct.

The Statement of Purpose

provided by the Idaho legislature in first adopting this provision indicates that the intent
of this provision was to protect those who may be the victims of crime from being
contacted by the alleged perpetrator when the victim is covered by a no-contact order
and to allow for warrantless arrests where there is probable cause to believe that this
has occurred. See S.L. 1997, ch. 314, § 1. Subsequent changes to this statute have
expanded this law to address the personal culpability of those who engage in repeated
efforts at violating no-contact orders issued by the court. See S.L. 2008, ch. 259, § 1.
Because a violation of I.C. § 18-920 is the type of offense directed at personal
culpability, it is therefore subject to the requirement of a union of act and intent as
contained in I.C. § 18-114. Moreover, the action for which the defendant must have a
demonstrable intent is not merely contact under I.C. § 18-920, but is rather contact that
is directed at the person covered by the no-contact order and that is in violation of the
order itself. See I.C. § 18-920(2)(c).
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 305, provides, "In every crime of public offense
there must exist a union or joint operation of act and [intent] [or] [criminal negligence]."

3

See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 139 Idaho 402, 404-405 (Ct. App. 2003).

8

ICJI 305 (brackets in original). This instruction is based on Idaho Code§ 18-114, which
provides, "[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation,
of act and intent, or criminal negligence." I.C. § 18-114. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that such an instruction "is and should be generally given." State v. Baldwin, 69
Idaho 459, 464 (1949).
Thus, in Idaho, conviction for a criminal offense requires the jury to find a
requisite state of mind. State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
misfortune or accident defense jury instruction proper, but not required, in a battery
prosecution where the jury was already instructed on the requisite state of mind
element). Here, the jury was never instructed as to the requisite state of mind element.
The only instruction specific to the offense, including the intent necessary, was the
general elements instruction. (R., p.35Q.) Notably, unlike in Macias, the requirement of
union or joint operation of act and intent instruction was not given, thus the jury in this
case was left only with the elements of violation of a no contact order, which does not
contain a knowledge requirement, and was thus never instructed as to the mens rea of
the offense. 4 Thus, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Beeks' right to due process
and his right to a fair trial.

4

Jury Instruction No.12 provided:
Violating a No Contact Order, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about September 8, 2013
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant, Tristum Beeks II
4. had been charged with Domestic Assault or Domestic Battery
5. a no contact order had been issued by a court or by an Idaho criminal
rule forbidding the defendant from having contact with Amanda Murillo,
and
6. the defendant had contact with Amanda Murillo in violation of the order,
and
9

Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record.

The law is clear that

conviction for a criminal offense requires the jury to find a requisite state of mind. See

Macias, 142 Idaho 509. The record in this case contains the jury instructions given at
trial and noticeably omits any instruction as to the union of act and intent. (R., pp.35A35X.)
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. At trial there was a question of whether Mr. Beeks initiated the video visit
or if he merely participated in the video visit instigated by Ms. Murillo. (Trial Tr., p.80,
L.8 - p.81, L.6.) Yet, the jury was not instructed that it had to find Mr. Beeks intended
the contact, instead it was instructed that if the contact occurred after Mr. Beeks had
notice of the no contact order, he could be found guilty. (R., p.35Q.) Where the facts of
Mr. Beeks' case seriously call into question whether Mr. Beeks had any intent to contact
Ms. Murillo, it was error for the district court not to instruct the jury on the requirement
that there be a union of act and intent.
Because the failure of the district court to give the jury this instruction violated
Mr. Beeks' right to due process and his right to a fair trial, and because he meets all
three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Beeks' conviction must be vacated.

7. before such contact the defendant had notice of the order.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p.35Q.)

10

B.

The District Court Frred In Refusing To Instruct The Jury That Acts Or Omissions
Committed Through Misfortune Or Accident Are Not Criminal
The district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on culpability for acts or

omissions committed through misfortune or accident, where the evidence adduced at
trial supported giving such an instruction and Mr. Beeks requested such an instruction.
In determining whether a defendant's requested instruction should have been
given, the appellate court "must examine the instructions that were given and the
evidence that was adduced at trial." State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881 (1987). "[T]he
refusal to give a particular requested instruction is not erroneous where the substance
of the proposed instruction is covered elsewhere in the instructions given." Watson v.

Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 678 (1992) (citations omitted).
Under the specific language of I.C. § 18-201 (3) (emphasis added), people "who
committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortune or by accident,
when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable negligence," are in
a "class" that is deemed "(in]capable of committing crimes."
Here, defense counsel asked the district court to instruct the jury with Idaho
Criminal Jury Instruction 1508, which provides that acts or omissions committed through
misfortune or accident, and with no evil design, intention or culpable negligence, are not
criminal. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.83, Ls.2-6; R., pp.26A-26B.) At the conclusion of the trial,
the district court, after hearing argument from both parties, declined to give the
requested instruction. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.74, L.3 - p.82, L.23, p.82, Ls.3-5.) The district
court ruled that the defense could still argue that the violation was unintentional, even
without the instruction. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.80, L.24 - p.82, L.3.)
The district court erred, as the evidence at trial showed that Ms. Murillo made the
decision to create an account, to travel to the jail, and to initiate a video visit with
11

Mr. Beeks. (Trial Tr., p.12, Ls.20-22, p.15, Ls.10-15.) The district court even noted at
sentencing:
This crime never would have been committed if she hadn't voluntarily set
up an account so she could visit you, go down to the jail and log into a
false account saying she is somebody other than she was in order to get
that visitation and visit with you.
(3/14/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-20.)
The evidence showed that Mr. Beeks walked into the video visitation room and
had another inmate stand in for him, as a precaution, should he be told that a no contact
order was in place between him and Ms. Murillo. (State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Even after
Ms. Murillo initially represented that it was okay to talk, he again wanted her to confirm
that it was okay for them to communicate.

(State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Only after she

reassured him by saying, "Why wouldn't it be?" did he participate in the video visitation.
(State's Trial Exhibit 1.) It was only later, fifteen minutes into their visit, when Mr. Beeks
again checked with Ms. Murillo by asking her if she had gone to court to get the no
contact order dropped that he got the straight answer-no, she had not. (State's Trial
Exhibit 1.) Further, there was a question of whether Mr. Beeks initiated the video visit or
if he merely participated in the video visit instigated by Ms. Murillo.
The jury, and even the district court, was certainly aware that Ms. Murillo
facilitated the commission of this crime. Further, it appeared that Mr. Beeks was being
cautious and trying to obey the terms of the no contact order and that he appeared
ready to leave the room in order to obey the law. (State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Ultimately, he
only remained in the video visit room in reliance on Ms. Murillo's representation that it
was okay to talk.

(State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Thus the district court's unwillingness to

instruct the jury as to a misfortunate event or accident, despite Mr. Beeks' request for
the instruction and evidence that Mr. Beeks' contact with Ms. Murillo was purely
12

unintentional or based on a mistaken belief that she had the no contact order lifted, was
error.

11.
The State Engaged In Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial
Mr. Beeks' one day trial was rife with instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Mr. Beeks asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and the
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor: (1) alluded numerous times to
information in this case that would be kept from the jury, and then offered prohibited
evidence by telling the jury that Mr. Beeks had previously been charged with domestic
assault or battery; and (2) implicitly asked the jury to find Mr. Beeks guilty based on
information other than the evidence adduced at trial.

Because these instances of

misconduct were not objected to by defense counsel, Mr. Beeks can only prevail to the
extent that he can establish fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224-26, 227.
For the reasons set forth fully below, Mr. Beeks contends that each of the alleged
instances of misconduct satisfies the Perry standard.

Mr. Beeks asserts that the

prosecutor's misconduct deprived Mr. Beeks of his right to a fair trial where the
prosecutor asked the jury render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence
admitted at trial, which amounted to fundamental error, and, therefore this Court should
vacate his conviction, and his case remanded to the district court for a new trial.

A.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[e]very person accused of crime in
Idaho has the right to a fair and impartial trial." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504

13

(1980). Further, the prosecutor has an independent duty to the defendant with regard to
his or her right to a fair trial. In the words of the Supreme Court:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to
the jury. They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing
they transgress upon the rights of the accused."

State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the duty of the district court
when the prosecutor implies that the jury may consider additional information other than
that which was presented at trial:
Petitioner's right to have the jury deliberate solely on the basis of the
evidence cannot be permitted to hinge upon a hope that defense counsel
will be a more effective advocate for that proposition than the prosecutor
will be in implying that extraneous circumstances may be considered. It
was the duty of the court to safeguard petitioner's rights, a duty only it
could have performed reliably.

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 4 78, 489 (1978) (internal citation omitted).
As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, "As public officers, prosecutors have a duty
to ensure that defendants receive fair trials." State

v.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715

(2009). Thus "a prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds
of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.' A
prosecutor must also ensure that the jury receives only competent evidence."

Id.

(quoting State v. !twin, 9 Idaho 35, 44 (1903)).
In State v. Beebe, the Idaho Court of Appeals analyzed the purpose of closing
argument, noting that "closing argument is an opportunity for the attorneys to clarify the
issues that must be resolved by the jury; to review the evidence and discuss, from the
parties' respective standpoints, the inferences that jurors should draw therefrom; and to
discuss the law contained in the jury instructions as it applies to the trial evidence. 145
14

Idaho 570, 576 (Ct. App. 2007) (vacating conviction where prosecutor misstated the
evidence, misstated the law by grotesquely mischaracterizing the defendant's defense,
and repeatedly appealed to the jury to decide the case on factors other than evidence of
guilt). The Beebe Court held that "[u]rgings, explicit or implied, for the jury to render a
verdict based on factors other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law contained
in the jury instructions have no place in closing arguments." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that "[w]here a prosecutor attempts to
secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and
the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial," and thus is reviewable as fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Idaho law is clear-it is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to evidence that was
not admitted in an attempt to imply to the jury what that evidence would have been.
State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the prosecutor

disregarded the district court's ruling and, therefore, engaged in prosecutorial conduct
when the prosecutor repeatedly questioned the witness about the contents of a report
which was not in evidence); see also State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 596-97 (Ct. App.
1995) (prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor intentionally disregards district

court's ruling that testimony is inadmissible hearsay and attempts to elicit hearsay
indirectly); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that prosecutorial
misconduct necessitated a new trial where improper arguments of prosecutor sought a
finding of guilt based on factors outside the evidence).
In Martinez, the prosecutor told the jury that the doctor who examined the victim
"was prevented from saying certain things." Id. 136 Idaho at 525. The Idaho Court of
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Appeals found that the prosecutor was not only making reference to something that had
been ruled inadmissible, but was implying to the jury what the evidence would have
been. Id. The Martinez Court further held that "It was misconduct for the prosecutor to
suggest that by making an objection that was sustained by the district court, [the
defendant] had 'prevented' the jury from hearing damaging evidence." Id.

B.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Tell The Jury That There V\/ould Be
Information In The Case He Was Not Allowed To Talk About And That Mr. Beeks
Had A Prior Domestic Violence Charge
The prosecutor committed misconduct during his rebuttal closing argument when

he explained to the jury that Mr. Beeks had been charged with domestic assault or
domestic battery but he was not allowed to give the jury any details. Particularly where
the prosecutor had previously indicated during voir dire that there would be information
in the case that he would not get to talk about, such a claim constituted prosecutorial
misconduct.
In this case, the prosecution never filed a notice that it intended to introduce
evidence of Mr. Beeks' prior bad acts, thus the district court properly advised the parties
that it expected the State not to mention Mr. Beeks' prior convictions. 5 (Supp. Trial Tr.,
p.9, Ls.5-6.) The district court asked the prosecution to request a bench conference
before introducing such evidence, should the prior convictions become relevant during

5

Prior to the start of trial, the district court told the parties:
And I would advise the State not to mention the prior convictions. Now,
it's entirely possible depending on the nature of the defense that they may
become relevant at some time in trial. Before bringing them out, please
ask for a bench conference to give me a chance to make that decision.

(Supp. Trial Tr., p.9, Ls.5-11.)
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the trial. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.9, Ls.5-11.) Yet the state did mention the prior charge, in
violation of the district court's order.
During voir dire, the prosecutor began setting the stage for its proposition that
there was information that the jury would not get to hear during the trial. The prosecutor
implied numerous times that there was evidence that the jury would not hear aboutfacts in the case that he was not allowed to tell them about:
PROSECUTOR: And you're not going to be able to get everything maybe
you want. I mean, it's funny how the criminal justice system works, but
you only get the evidence that's relevant, that matters .... So I don't get to
go into like all the reasons. I don't get to like, you know - this isn't
judgment day, you know, at the end of your life. I'm not trying to, you
know, say you're a good or bad person. But you only get to put so much
evidence on. And there might be something else that you want to know,
something else that you think well, I'd like to know this before I hit this guy
with this, you know, with a conviction or a not guilty.
(Supp. Trial Tr., p.39, L.17 - p.40, L.8.)
PROSECUTOR: So you may not be given all of the information that you
might think you want. Okay. But if you're given all of the information
that's relevant, can you go ahead and make a verdict on this case or do
you need more information if you just feel like: I want more? What do you
do with that, with that feeling of: Oh, I wish I knew the whole story behind
something?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: You can only base your judgment on the
information that you're given. You can't go with a what if.
PROSECUTOR: Thank you. Right. So there's going to be some
information here in this case, for example, that I am not going to get to talk
about, I'm not going to get to like go on and on about, I might like to or
notTHE COURT: Counsel.
PROSECUTOR: Judge, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: I don't want you to give the implication that there's other
information out there in this case. That's improper to do that.
PROSECUTOR: I'm sorry.
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THE COURT: The jury will be given all of the information that is relevant
to this case, and it's improper to leave it open for them to speculate about
the potential of other information out there. So don't go into that anymore.
That's just speculation and (Supp. Trial Tr., p.40, L 17 - p.41, L.20.) Even after being admonished by the district
court, the prosecutor continued in this vein during his rebuttal closing argument
THE PROSECUTOR:
Had been charged with domestic assault or
domestic battery. Can I see the paper exhibits. I'll just grab them all.
Ladies and gentlemen, there's a reason why I didn't go into any gory detail
here. Okay. I don't get to. And I would have drawn an objection had I
done so. So it's a little bit disingenuous to then argue that he wasn't
charged with one of these crimes, domestic assault or domestic battery.
He had been. That's what we marked on the no contact order. The
reason we don't go into details is because I'm not allowed to.
(Supp. Trial Tr., p.103, L.16 - p.104, L.3.)
Here, the prosecutor had the opportunity to have the last word and leave the last
impression in the minds of the jurors as to how to evaluate this case. The prosecutor
used that opportunity to further insinuate that the jurors had not heard all of the
evidence and that there was additional information out there that was kept from the
jury-essentially asking the jury to decide the case based on facts not in evidence. Not
only did the prosecutor insinuate that there was additional evidence out there
throughout the trial-the prosecutor flat out told them that he was not allowed to go into
details about the domestic assault or domestic battery charge. (Trial Tr., p.103, L.16 p.104, L.3.) Further, such a statement was inaccurate where the district court had, prior
to trial, asked the prosecution to "please ask for a bench conference to give [it] a chance
to make that decision" before introducing evidence of a prior charge.
Mr. Beeks did not object to the misconduct, but he can show that the claim raised
is one of fundamental error. The first question under Perry is whether the misconduct
violated an un-waived constitutional right. Mr. Beeks contends that it did; he asserts
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that it violated his right to a fair trial and due process of !aw. 6

See Donnelly v.

OeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (recognizing that where prosecutorial
misconduct does not directly infringe upon rights specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution (such as the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination), it
may violate the Constitution by rendering the defendant's trial unfair). The prosecutor
told the jury during voir dire that there was "information here in this case, for example,
that I am not going to get to talk about" and then told them in his rebuttal closing
statement that Mr. Beeks was charged with domestic assault or domestic battery but
"[t]he reason we don't go into details is because I'm not allowed to."

(Supp. Trial

Tr., p.41, Ls.4-7, p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.3.) Where the prosecutor told the jury of Mr.
Beeks' prior charge, he introduced inadmissible evidence the district court had
preliminarily cautioned him not to mention in an effort to substantiate one of the
elements of the offense. Further, by repeatedly telling the jury that there were facts in
the case that they did not get to hear, then telling them he was not allowed to tell them
of the domestic violence charge, the prosecutor essentially asked the jury to decide the
case on information other than what was in evidence.

In light of all of this, it cannot be

said that Mr. Beeks received a fair trial.
The next question under Perry is whether the error is plain. In this case, it is.
The district court clearly told the prosecutor not to bring it up during the trial. (Supp.
Trial Tr., p.9, Ls.5-1.)

Moreover, there could be no strategic reason for a defense

attorney to fail to object to such testimony; there is simply nothing to be gained from
allowing a prosecutor to tell the jury that there is evidence outside the record which
further supports the prosecution.

6

See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13.
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The final question under Perry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the State's misconduct affected the outcome of Mr. Beeks' trial. Mr. Beeks submits that
there is. This case turned on whether the State had proven all of the elements of the
offense. Here, the prosecutor improperly insinuated that there was information in the
case that the jury was not going to hear, which was then substantiated when the
prosecutor told the jury he was not allowed to talk about the prior charge for domestic
battery or domestic assault. Although Mr. Beeks referenced the no contact order during
the video visit so the jury could have concluded that he did have notice of the no contact
order; the prosecutor's misconduct led the jurors to believe that there was all sorts of
other evidence of Mr. Beeks' guilt and bad character out there which would not be
admitted at trial. The jury would thus be far more likely to convict Mr. Beeks based on
the evidence not actually adduced at trial, but repeatedly referenced by the prosecutor.
The prosecutor was essentially asking the jury to decide the case on facts not in
evidence. Thus, there is at least a reasonable possibility that that misconduct affected
the outcome of the trial where the conduct was done repeatedly, thereby tainting the
entire trial.

C.

It Was Misconduct To Repeatedly Reference Multiple No Contact Orders
The State elicited improper testimony on the existence of multiple no contact

orders from its own investigator.

Even if the prosecutor's employee volunteered the

information, the office of the prosecutor is responsible to instruct its witnesses,
especially employee witnesses, about the appropriate topics of direct examination.
Further, the prosecutor emphasized the improper testimony when he repeatedly
referenced the multiple no contact orders in his closing statement and in so doing,
committed misconduct.
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During the prosecutor's direct examination, Ken Boals, an investigator with the
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office, was asked whether there was a no contact order in
place. Mr. Boals spontaneously testified that there were two no contact orders in place.
The relevant exchange occurred as follows:
THE PROSECUTOR: With whom are the no contact order - was the no
contact order in effect?

A: I noted there was two [sic]. There was one issued in February, I
believe February 11 th , that had a Ms. Murillo listed, Amanda, and then
there's also I believe several children listed on that no contact order. And
then I noted another one that was in place June 24 th of 2013 with just
Amanda Murillo.
(Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.12-21.) Then the prosecutor highlighted that testimony for the jury in
his closing argument:
PROSECUTOR:
You're going to hear testimony or you did hear
testimony, excuse me, from Officer Boals that there were multiple no
contact orders in place. Multiple.
(Supp. Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.13-16.)
And again in his rebuttal closing argument:
THE PROSECUTOR: And that's why you have this [no contact order],
which is the amended one, one of the ones in effect. Okay. One of the
ones.
Again, I didn't want to be unreasonably cumulative and throw all of them at
you. Instead you just got the one, okay, this one no contact order.
THE COURT. Ladies and gentlemen, I have to interrupt here. The
defendant is charged with violating a specific no contact order. It would be
improper to speculate that there are other orders out there. The defendant
is not charged with violating any other orders.
THE PROSECUTOR: He's charged - okay. So he's charged with this
one order. It's all here, ladies and gentlemen. And you have before you
the video where he talks about this very - these very no contact orders.
He knows they exist. There's no - you can - the evidence that shows that
he knows that they exist is right before you.
(Supp. Trial Tr., p.104, L.17- p.105, L.12.)
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For the prosecutor to doggedly harp on the existence of multiple no contact
orders only served to encourage the jury to improperly find Mr. Beeks guilty by
speculating that where there were several no contact orders in place, he must have
known of at least one of them-thus improperly deciding the case on information other
than what was charged by the state and admitted as evidence at trial.
As counsel did not object to the testimony, Mr. Beeks' appellate claim must be
evaluated in light of the fundamental error standard of Perry. Here, the claim raised is
one of fundamental error.

The first question under Perry is whether the misconduct

violated an un-waived constitutional right.

Mr. Beeks contends that it did; he asserts

that it violated his right to a fair trial and due process of law. 7 See DeChristoforo, supra.
Although the State's witness spontaneously testified about the existence of multiple no
contact orders, this was the prosecution's own employee, who should have been
instructed not to volunteer information regarding other no contact orders.
Tr., p.32, Ls.12-21.)

(Trial

Further, the prosecutor compounded the error by repeatedly

referencing the multiple no contact orders in both his closing statement and his rebuttal
closing statement. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.13-16, p.104, L.17 - p.105, L.12.) As such,
the State essentially asked the jury to find Mr. Beeks guilty based on speculation that
there was extraneous information that was not before the jury. Specifically, where there
were several no contact orders in place, logic would dictate that Mr. Beeks must have
known of at least one of them-thus the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to decide
the case on information other than what was charged by the State and admitted at trial.
Further, even after the district court admonished the prosecutor, he continued to refer to

7

See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13.
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multiple no contact orders. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.105, Ls.9-12.) In light of all of this, it
cannot be said that Mr. Beeks received a fair trial.
The next question under Perry is whether the error is plain. In this case, it is.
Idaho law is clear that the jury must decide the case on the evidence it hears at trial and
reasonable inferences it may draw from that evidence. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227 (holding
"[w]here a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial").

It is improper for the prosecutor to

encourage the jury to render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence
admitted at trial and the law contained in the jury instructions. Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576.
Moreover, there could be no strategic reason for a defense attorney to fail to object to
such testimony; there is simply nothing to be gained from allowing information in which
would only serve to confuse the jury and likely would lead them to speculate that the

defendant must have known of at least one of the no contact orders. Further, such
evidence may have led the jury to speculate as to why there were multiple no contact
orders, and whether there had been additional criminal conduct by Mr. Beeks. Although
defense counsel later filed a post-trial motion in which he claimed that his failure to
object was strategic where he did not want to highlight the issue to the jury, such is
plainly absurd where defense counsel could have objected and either: (1) requested a
side bar with the court; (2) asked that his objection be taken up outside the presence of
the jury; or (3) moved for a mistrial. Thus the failure to object in this case could not
constitute a legitimate trial strategy.
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The final question under Perry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the State's misconduct affected the outcome of Mr. Beek's trial. Mr. Beeks submits that
there is. This case turned on whether the State had satisfied
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

burden at trial to prove

In light of this, one critical

issue in the case was whether Mr. Beeks had notice of the no contact order in effect at
the time of the video visit with Ms. Murillo. Given that the prosecutor improperly relied
on the existence of multiple no contact orders in summarizing the State's case to the
jury-essentially asking the jury to find Mr. Beeks guilty based on speculation that
where there were several no contact

in place, logic would dictate that Mr. Beeks

must have known of at least one of them-there is at least a reasonable possibility that
that misconduct affected the outcome of the trial.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Beeks respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 23 rd day of January, 2015.

SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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